Thursday, May 7, 2015

Russia's Greatest Weapon May Be Its Hackers

Russia's Greatest Weapon May Be Its Hackers

2015_05_08_Cover_600 x 800Newsweek
 
 
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The Americans and Israelis pioneered the technique back in 2009 when the Stuxnet program infiltrated Iranian computer systems and wrecked thousands of uranium-enriching centrifuges.
 
But now other players—especially the Russians and Chinese—are getting into the game of remotely using computer networks to destroy infrastructure and threaten human lives.
 
Last year, according to a report by Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security, a blast furnace melted down in an unnamed industrial city in Germany after a digital attack on its control systems, causing “massive damage.”
 
 
It nearly happened in the United States too, when unknown hackers succeeded in penetrating U.S. electrical, water and fuel distribution systems early in 2014. While old-fashioned, relatively low-tech data hacks make headlines—for instance, high-profile break-ins over the last 12 months to the email systems and databases of the White House, State Department, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense and Sony Pictures Inc.—what has security officials seriously worried is the new and dangerous world of cyber-to-physical infrastructure attacks.
 
“This is not theoretical,” National Security Agency Director Admiral Michael Rogers told the U.S. House of Representatives’ Intelligence Committee recently. Hacking attacks on the U.S. and its allies are “costing us hundreds of billions of dollars,” Rogers warned, and will result in “truly significant, almost catastrophic failures if we don’t take action.” 
 
 
According to Alexander Klimburg, an affiliate of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center and senior research fellow at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, “cyberspace today is like Europe in 1914, before World War I. Governments are like sleepwalkers. They do not comprehend the power of new technology and the consequences of misunderstanding each other’s activities.”
 
According to the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 2015 “Worldwide Threat Assessment” report, Russia and China are the "most sophisticated nation-state actors” in the new generation of cyberwarfare, and Russian hackers lead in terms of sophistication, programming power and inventiveness.
 
“The threat from China is overinflated, while the threat from Russia is underestimated,” says Jeffrey Carr, head of Web security consultancy Taia Global and author of the book Inside Cyber Warfare. “The Russians are the most technically proficient. For instance, we believe that Russian hackers-for-hire were responsible for the Sony attack.”
 
Last year hackers gained access to thousands of Sony company emails and threatened further damage unless a film lampooning North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was withdrawn from cinemas. “We spoke to [one of the hackers] via an intermediary,” says Carr. “Even after Sony lost 80 percent of its network capability, the hackers were still operating. That shows an incredibly high level of technical ability.”
 
The Moscow connection is worrying because Russia is the only country to date to have combined cyberwarfare with assaults by conventional guns and tanks. “The Russia-Georgia war of 2008 was a perfect example of a combined kinetic and cyber operation,” says Carr. “Nobody else has ever done anything like that.”
05_08_RussianHackers_02 Russian President Vladimir Putin (C) shakes hands with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu during a meeting in Sochi, November 24, 2014. Putin has characterized the Internet as a “CIA invention” and this month ordered the FSB to “cleanse the Russian Internet” by forcing all Internet providers to keep their servers in Russia—another turn of the screw in the Kremlin’s long-term plan to create a separate Russian Internet. Alexei Druzhinin/RIA Novosti/Kremlin/Reuters
Similarly, in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in April 2014, ground assaults were accompanied by a deluge of mostly low-tech cyberassaults on over a hundred government and industrial organizations in Poland and Ukraine, as well as attacks on the European Parliament and the European Commission.
 
Many of these attacks featured a modified version of “BlackEnergy,” a kind of malware program known as a Trojan horse that is designed to remotely take over computers. A network of such infected computers, or “bots,” is known as a “botnet.” This can be mobilized to overwhelm a target server with requests for information and crash it—an attack known as Distributed Denial of Service, or DDoS.
 
 
“The BlackEnergy malware was authored by a Russian hacker and originally used for DDoS attacks, bank frauds and spam distribution,” says Pierluigi Paganini, founder of the Security Affairs blog and a member of a European Union Agency for Network and Information Security working group. “But the new variant was used in targeted attacks on government entities and private companies across a range of industries.”
 
 
One of the biggest mysteries of the latest generation of cyberattacks—known in the U.S. government as Offensive Cyber Effects Operations—is working out who is behind them and whether they are being launched with political or criminal intent.
What’s not in doubt is that Russian hackers have long been kings of the cybercrime world.
 
A group of Russians and Ukrainians were named by U.S. federal prosecutors as being behind the biggest cybercrime case in U.S. history, a bank-card fraud spree from 2010 to 2013 that cost companies including J.C. Penney, JetBlue and French retailer Carrefour more than $300 million. A group of Russian “click-jackers” were convicted in the U.S. last year for hijacking users of Apple's iTunes store, Netflix, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Amazon.com, ESPN.com and the Wall Street Journal website—as well as computers at NASA.
 
 
Another as-yet-unidentified hacking ring, based in a small city in south-central Russia, stole some 1.2 billion Internet logins and passwords and more than 500 million email addresses last year by plundering data from more than 400,000 websites, according to U.S. cybersecurity firm Hold Security.
 
And in February the Moscow-based Internet security company Kaspersky Labs revealed details of the biggest Internet heist of all time—a raid on over 100 banks in Russia, Ukraine, Japan, the United States and Europe from 2013 to 2014. Kaspersky reported seeing evidence of $300 million in losses just from the banks that had hired it to clean up the mess—and estimated that the total amount stolen was likely to be around $900 million.
“This is cybercrime on an industrial scale,” says one Moscow-based Western Internet security consultant, who helped overhaul several Russian banks’ defenses in the wake of the attack. “In one case in Kiev, they made the bank’s ATMs spew out money, which was collected by people walking by.”
 
 
The techniques used to break into the bank’s electronic systems via flaws in Adobe and Microsoft programs “were not particularly sophisticated,” says the consultant, “but it was amazing how careful they were not to alert the victims and to keep their backdoor into their systems a secret.”
05_08_RussianHackers_04 Customers queue to withdraw hryvnia currency from an ATM outside a Privatbank CJSC bank branch in Kiev, Ukraine, on February 20, 2014. Among the most frightening new-generation cyberweapons are those designed to target super-secure, so-called “air-gapped” systems that have no links to the Internet or outside networks. Vincent Mundy/Bloomberg/Getty 
                        
The exact nature of the links between these criminal hackers and the Russian government remains murky.
 
“Cybercrime, cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare share a common technological basis, tools, logistics and operational methods,” says Klimburg. “They can also share the same social networks and have comparable goals.
 
The differences between these categories of cyberactivity are often razor–thin. It’s hard to distinguish in cyberspace between financial and political motivation.”
 
In particular, the methods of delivering malware into a target computer are identical.
 
Hackers seek vulnerabilities in popular programs that allow them to introduce alien code, in particular a weak spot in the code known as a “zero-day,” meaning it remains unpatched and can be used for an attack before it is discovered by everyone else, so there are zero-days between an attack and the discovery of the vulnerability.
 
A good zero-day vulnerability can be sold for $200,000, says Klimburg, but there are many examples of Russian hackers “lending” their zero-day hacks to the government for espionage purposes, then using them for crime later.
 
“Hundreds of ‘black-hat’ Russian hackers are doing this for a living—whether it’s at the order of Swiss bankers or Ukrainian oligarchs,” says Carr. “Russian hackers who are caught are given the choice to work for the FSB [Federal Security Service] or to go to jail. The FSB also has some on contract hire.”
 
 
 
There is strong evidence, going back to cyberattacks on Estonia as early as 2007, that Russian cybercriminals were working either with or for the Russian state. But now, it seems, the Kremlin is getting directly involved. U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March that Russia’s Ministry of Defense is “establishing its own cybercommand” responsible for “conducting offensive cyberactivities.”
 
 
And the Russian government appears to be stepping up funding for the research and development of cybertechnology at world-class computer science centers such as the prestigious St. Petersburg Polytechnic University and Samara State University, according to information gathered by Seattle-based Taia Global.
 
 
 
Possible evidence linking recent hacking attacks on the U.S. government to the Russian state includes the digital signatures of a hacker group known as Advanced Persistent Threat 28 (or APT28, identified by the U.S.-based Internet security company FireEye) and a family of hackers labeled CozyDuke, CosmicDuke, MiniDuke and OnionDuke (spotted by Kaspersky Labs). These groups, which may or may not be related, have some giveaway signatures that tie them to Russia.
 
 
“Indicators in APT28’s malware suggest that the group consists of Russian speakers operating during business hours in Russia’s major cities,” says a recent FireEye report. “More than half of the malware samples...attributed to APT28 included Russian-language settings.”
But the real giveaway is not the forensics of the APT28 codes but their targets over the past five years, which have included Georgia’s ministries of internal affairs and defense, the Polish and Hungarian governments, NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Norwegian army and U.S. defense contractors. The APT28 hacking crew "does not appear to conduct widespread intellectual property theft for economic gain, but instead is focused on collecting intelligence,” says FireEye. “That would be most useful to a government.”
 
 
Though there is evidence that the development teams of APT28 and the CosmicDuke, MiniDuke and OnionDuke “worked together and shared same knowledge and coding techniques,” and that they all have Russian origins, it’s likely they are separate groups, says Paganini.
 
 “All these groups are state-sponsored hackers, probably backed by the Russian government, though it is likely that they operate under different divisions of the same cyberarmy.”
 
Was APT28—and the Kremlin—behind hacking attacks on the White House and State Department this year, which cracked open confidential email records (though not, according to a spokesman, the president’s personal email)?
 
The Kremlin strongly denies it. “We know that blaming Russia for everything has turned into a sport,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov joked to journalists. “At least they haven't looked for Russian submarines in [Washington's] Potomac River, as has been the case in a few other countries.”
05_08_RussianHackers_03 Vladimir Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov attends a meeting in the Kremlin in Moscow, on December 25, 2013. There is strong evidence, going back to cyberattacks on Estonia as early as 2007, that Russian cybercriminals were working either with or for the Russian state. But now, it seems, the Kremlin is getting directly involved. Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP/Getty 
                        
Yet some code—in particular, the family of “backdoors” into programs known as CHOPSTICK—regularly used by APT28 has been linked to those virtual break-ins. And there’s less ambiguity about a similar attack on an unclassified military network at the U.S. Department of Defense last year. “We analyzed their network activity, associated it with Russia and then quickly kicked them off the network," Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said in April.
Cyberspying on the West Wing’s emails may be cheeky, but it’s not much different from the old-school espionage and signals-intelligence games that Russia and America have been playing for decades.
 
What’s truly scary, on the other hand, is infiltrating physical infrastructure in a way that could herald a new generation of violent covert action and sabotage. “This is an entirely new way of waging war,” says one former KGB general once posted as a spy to London who now works in the private security sector. “It is like the invention of planes or submarines. Suddenly you can attack the enemy from a completely new and unexpected direction.... This is the essence of warfare: constant surprise.”
 
 
In April, Eugene Kaspersky, the Moscow-born CEO of Kaspersky Labs, noted that there has been a dramatic surge in targeted attacks against power grids, banks and transportation networks around the world—and warned that groups targeting crucial infrastructure have “the capacity to inflict very visible damage. The worst terrorist attacks are not expected.”
 
 
 
Among the most frightening new-generation cyberweapons are those designed to target super-secure, so-called “air-gapped” systems that have no links to the Internet or outside networks.
 
 
The developers of Stuxnet bridged the air gap by developing ingenious programs that infected CD-ROMs and memory sticks that then colonized Iran’s nuclear development computers, ultimately inflicting devastating physical damage on uranium centrifuges and forcing the Iranians to replace their entire computer infrastructure.
 
 
 But a Stuxnet-like program that can be carried by email and memory sticks, called Uroburos, has been around since 2011—and was diagnosed as being of Russian origin. Uroburos targets Microsoft Windows, sets up surreptitious communications with its parent network and is able to leap across air gaps isolating secure networks from the Internet.
 
 
“The scary thing is that now everyone can do pretty much anything to anyone,” says Klimburg. He believes that one way to distinguish between criminal and government cyberactivity is measuring the amount of programming resources an attack requires—like malware designed to leap across air gaps.
 
“If you see a huge amount of organization and programming going into an attack, that’s a good indicator that there’s a government involved.”
The U.S. and Europe remain extremely vulnerable to infrastructure attacks—especially as so much of these developed economies’ vital infrastructure is now electronic, from financial systems to social networks.
 
One small example: In late April, a fleet of American Airlines Boeing 737s was temporarily grounded after an iPad application known as an “electronic flight bag” used by pilots for preflight checks crashed. The iPad app replaced 13 pounds of paper manuals—but when it went down, so did the entire fleet.
More worrying, though still hypothetical:
 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office issued an official warning in April that “modern aircraft’s interconnectedness can potentially provide unauthorized remote access to aircraft avionics systems” and that an aircraft’s Wi-Fi access could be exploited by hackers. When security researcher Chris Roberts joked on Twitter about how easy it would be to “start playing with the EICAS”—Engine-Indicating and Crew-Alerting System—he was bumped off a flight. Boeing issued a statement saying that “no changes to the flight plans loaded into the airplane systems can take place without pilot review and approval.”
 
 
Other infrastructure is just as unprotected. A recent survey by the energy industry consultants Black & Veatch revealed that only 32 percent of U.S. electric utility companies had integrated security systems with the “proper segmentation, monitoring and redundancies needed for cyberthreat protection.”


In February, President Barack Obama set up a new Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, described as “a national intelligence center focused on connecting the dots regarding malicious foreign cyberthreats to the nation.”

Defense Secretary Carter made a trip to the heart of Silicon Valley, this month to help improve relationships with tech companies after damaging revelations by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden about digital surveillance. “This threat affects us all,” Carter told the assembled techies. "There are also really great opportunities to be seized through a new level of partnership between the Pentagon and Silicon Valley.”


Behind the scenes, American spy agencies are also busy fighting a secret war against cyberenemies. Snowden—now in hiding in Russia—publicly revealed the massive scale of data mining by U.S. intelligence agencies, often in apparent violation of protections for U.S. citizens’ privacy. But a recent report by Kaspersky Labs suggests that the U.S. is no slouch in the hacking department either.
 
 A hacking collective that Kaspersky’s team dubbed Equation Group—sponsored, it coyly says, “by a nation-state with nearly unlimited resources”—has for the past 14 years apparently been busy planting top-flight spyware around the world, including a keystroke-logging program called Grok and a protective encryption system known as GrayFish.
 
The top targets? Iran and Russia, followed by Pakistan, China and India. The malware has targeted financial, government, diplomatic, aerospace and telecommunications networks, as well as research institutions and universities. According to Kaspersky’s engineers, the Equation Group designed “the world’s most mysterious malware warhead” as well as “a secret storage vault that survived military-grade disk wiping and reformatting, making sensitive data stolen from victims available even after reformatting the drive and reinstalling the operating system.”
 
 
Thanks to its vast resources, the U.S. may well be able to stay one step ahead of its cyberenemies. But the problem with this new battlefield is that none of the potential combatants know the rules—and, even more dangerous, no one can be certain of who the combatants are.
 
“It is not always possible to distinguish between cyberespionage, cyber covert action and, most importantly, preparation for cybersabotage or war,” says Klimburg. “Serious misunderstandings are preprogrammed.... The consequences of misidentifying the motive of the attacker could be, in diplomatic-speak, ‘inadvertent escalation’—or accidental cyberwar.”
 
Richard Clarke, head of cybersecurity and counterterrorism coordination in the George W. Bush administration, has warned of the dangers of a “false flag” cyberattack designed to create tension between the U.S. and, for instance, China and launched by a hidden third party.
 
 
Some academics have proposed “cybermilitary exercises” between the United States and Russia as a vehicle for trust building. Others suggest establishing “rules of the road”—a kind of informal agreement for cyberspace that outlines what is a legitimate target for espionage purposes, with an agreement not to target super-critical infrastructure such as power grids with cyberespionage attacks.
 
 
But even if Beijing could be persuaded to come on board, the current geopolitical tension between Washington and Moscow is hardly conducive to gentleman’s agreements. Russian President Vladimir Putin has characterized the Internet as a “CIA invention” and this month ordered the FSB to “cleanse the Russian Internet” by forcing all Internet providers to keep their servers in Russia—another turn of the screw in the Kremlin’s long-term plan to create a separate Russian Internet, a project to which Putin has pledged some $100 million since 2012.
 
And during the Sochi Olympics in February 2014, the FSB deployed aggressive cyberspying tools designed to infect foreign visitors’ computers and cellphones with spyware through Wi-Fi networks and cellphone towers.
 
It is unlikely that such a regime would shy away from using every cyberweapon at its disposal. It’s equally unlikely that, faced with a barrage of what White House spokeswoman Jan Psaki described as “hundreds of cyberattacks a day,” the U.S. will cease and desist from developing some of the world’s most sophisticated cyberweapons in retaliation. The cyber arms race is on.

Friday, March 20, 2015

Putin’s Arctic Ambitions Send Chill Through Neighbors

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http://www.newsweek.com/putins-arctic-ambitions-send-chill-through-neighbors-315089?piano_t=1


2015-03-19T115241Z_1618833986_GF10000031147_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-CRISIS-PUTIN-RATES 9206 9427
Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a session during the Week of Russian Business, organized by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, in Moscow on March 19, 2015.


Filed Under: Opinion, Russia, Arctic

Tensions have increased a notch in the Arctic with the news that the Russians have started a major military exercise in the region. Nearly 40,000 servicemen, 41 warships and 15 submarines will be taking part in drills to make them combat-ready—a major show of strength in an area that has long been an area of strategic interest to Russia.

Russia might be reshaping national borders in Europe as it reasserts its geopolitical influence, but the equivalent borders in the Arctic have never been firmly established. Historically, it has proved much harder for states to assert sovereignty over the ocean than over land, even in cases where waters are ice-covered for most of the year.

For centuries the extent to which a nation-state could control its coastal areas was based on the so-called cannon-shot rule—a three-nautical-mile limit based on the range of a cannon fired from the land. But this changed after World War II, leading to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) in 1982.
  
Under UNCLOS, every signatory was given the right to declare territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of up to 200 for commercial activities such as fishing and oil exploration. Signatories could also extend their sovereignty beyond the limits of this EEZ by up to an additional 150 nautical miles if they could prove that their continental shelves extended beyond 200 nautical miles from the shore.

Orderly settlement

It is quite common to read about a “scramble for the Arctic” in which the states concerned—Denmark, Norway, Canada, Russia and the U.S.—race to carve up the region among themselves. In fact, this is not a very accurate description.
There are two dimensions to developments in the region—one legal and the other political.

 In legal terms, these five littoral states have sought to use UNCLOS to establish borders and assert their primacy over much of the Arctic Ocean and the seabed below (with the exception of the U.S., which is yet to ratify the convention).
Canada and Russia have also used the special provisions provided by Article 234 of UNCLOS—relating to the right to regulate over ice-covered waters—to strengthen their authority over emerging Arctic shipping routes (the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route).
In 2008 the five states issued the Ilulissat Declaration, committing to the “orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims” using the legal framework provided by the law of the sea. 

This has been reflected in the continental shelf claims they have submitted to the U.N. over the past 15 years: Russia (2001), Norway (2006), Canada (2013) and Denmark (2014).
These submissions are all claims for an extension of exclusive rights to continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles from each land border. This leaves a small area in the central Arctic Ocean unclaimed but also raises issues about various territories where more than one state has posted a claim (see graphic below).

Among the claimants, Russia has been asked by the U.N. to submit further scientific evidence in support of its case. This has not yet happened to the other states, but since it will take time for their claims to be assessed, that may yet change. Until the U.S. ratifies UNCLOS, it can’t submit a claim.
Arctic claims (click to enlarge – or see original)
Arctic map 27-02-15
Insecure borders
Yet legal provisions only go so far. The question remains: What happens if the Arctic states become more assertive in the delimitation of their national borders?

Canada and Denmark have made significant commitments to backing up their claims, including developing new security strategies. In 2012 Denmark established a specialized military command to police its Arctic territories, for instance. But over the past decade, it is Russia that has advanced the most significant plans for building up its security forces in the region—even before its most recent exercises began.

In material terms, Russia currently has the most to gain from industrially developing its Arctic zone. The Russian Arctic contains significant reserves of hydrocarbons, diamonds, metals and other minerals with an estimated value of more than $22.4tn (£15.2tn). The area is already a major producer of rare and precious metals and important oil and gas fields.

This makes it easy to see why the Kremlin announced in 2008 that it will use the Arctic zone as a “strategic resource base” for the socioeconomic development of Russia in the 21st century. In 2013 the Kremlin further observed that such development would be heavily dependent on foreign investment, technology and expertise.

Yet this apparent openness to international business interests has been accompanied by an intense sense of insecurity about Russia maintaining influence and authority in the region. It is wary of a Western bloc forming within the Arctic Council (the five littoral states plus Finland, Iceland and Sweden) and has preferred to engage the other Arctic states on a bilateral or regional basis. Russia is particularly concerned about the potential for the EU and NATO to become more active in Arctic affairs, given that all of the other Arctic states are members of one or both of these organizations.

Vladimir Putin has spoken publicly about the need to keep tensions to a minimum in the Arctic, while embarking on an extensive military and security program in the region at the same time—not least, establishing a new Arctic strategic command last December.

The Kremlin showed in its response to the “Greenpeace 30,” who tried to seize a Russian oil platform in 2013, that it will not tolerate any threat to its economic activities in the Arctic, nor allow any precedent that might undermine its authority over what it essentially regards as its territorial waters.

Future uncertainties

Russia will submit a new claim for an extension of its EEZ into the Arctic Ocean to the U.N. in 2015 (encompassing an area of roughly 1.2 million square kilometers). Already, state officials in Russia are positioning the situation as a test of whether the international scientific community will accept Russian science.

A second rejection of Russian claims in the Arctic might further feed Russian concerns about being kept down and encircled by Western rivals. On the other hand, if Russia’s claim is accepted, the rest of the international community might quite rightly become concerned about how the Kremlin will exert its authority within such significantly expanded maritime borders in the Arctic. This is because Russia will likely continue using Article 234 of UNCLOS to enable it to exercise complete authority in its extended EEZ, with little regard for the right to innocent passage.

The deterioration in Russia’s relations with the West is only likely to up the stakes for the Kremlin when it comes to settling its maritime borders in the Arctic. Russia has remained engaged in the Arctic Council and has repeatedly called for the Arctic to remain insulated from the fallout from Ukraine. Yet in the coming years, Russia’s neighbors are likely to remain wary about how exactly the Kremlin plans to negotiate and secure its borders along its Arctic frontier.
To read installments from The Conversations Russia’s borders series, click here.

The ConversationDuncan Depledge is a postdoctoral researcher at Royal Holloway. This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article here.

Monday, March 9, 2015

Ezra Levant vs Noam Chomsky: The Complete Interview



In this provocative March 2015 interview -- which originally appeared on TheRebel.media in three parts -- Ezra Levant and Noam Chomsky debate a wide range of topics, including:

The state of free speech in America today, Obama's U.S. foreign policy, Israel and the rise of anti-semitism and more.

JOIN TheRebel.media for more news and commentary like this:
http://www.TheRebel.media

Jason Kenney: Defeating Muslim Terrorism's "Arc of Violence" The Rebel

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Published on Mar 8, 2015
On Friday March 6, 2015 at the Manning Networking Conference, Brian Lilley talked with recently appointed Defense Minister Jason Kenney.

They talked about the "steep learning curve" that accompanied Kenney's new cabinet position, and Kenney's family's history of military service.

Lilley asked Kenney how far Canada could spread its military resources to fight Muslim terrorism abroad.

(Note: This interview took place before news of the death of Sgt. Andrew Doiron in a friendly fire incident in northern Iraq.)

JOIN TheRebel.media for more exclusive content like this:
http://www.TheRebel.media/

Who are Canada's radical Muslim leaders? FIND OUT and fight back at CanadianJihad.cahttp://canadianjihad.ca/#/#petition

GET Ezra Levant's timely book about domestic radicalization and terrorism:
"The Enemy Within: Terror, Lies and the Whitewashing of Omar Khadr"
http://www.amazon.ca/Enemy-Within-Ter...

Sunday, February 22, 2015

"The Internet is on fire" HAVE YOU GIVEN UP YOUR FIRST BORN CHILD! You Now Have been WARNED ... The Internet is on fire | Mikko Hypponen | TEDxBrussels

HAVE YOU GIVEN  UP YOUR FIRST BORN CHILD! 

WOULD YOU !     OR     HAVE YOU!   

WHAT WILL BE YOUR COURSE OF ACTION!?..... 

There is NO Free lunch...you (we) pay through the nose ....some would say an arm and a leg  others would DEMAND YOUR FIRST BORN CHILD....

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Computer security expert Mikko Hypponen wants you to understand how the ways you use the Internet affects your privacy, security and more. At TEDxBrussels, he gives an impassioned talk that challenges all of us to think before we click.

Friday, February 20, 2015

National Counterterrorism Center Director Nicholas J. Rasmussen Statement for the Record Before the SSCI

   National Counterterrorism Center Director Nicholas J. Rasmussen Statement for the Record Before the SSCI       http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/recent-news

see:  Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
“ Current Terrorist Threat to the United States”February 12, 2015

Update read ..

  http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/12%20Feb%20SSCI%20Open%20Terrorist%20Threat%20Hearing%20SFR.pdf

Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Current Terrorist Threat to the United States



February 12, 2015
Nicholas J. Rasmussen
Director
National Counterterrorism Center
 
Thank you Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Feinstein, and members of the Committee. I appreciate this opportunity to be here today to discuss the worldwide terrorist threat and our efforts to counter it.

My statement reflects the collective work and insights of the National Counterterrorism
Center’s dedicated men and women. Although I am new to my position as their Director, I feel
privileged and honored to lead them. I want to express my appreciation to the Committee for its unflagging support of these hardworking officers.
 
Hearings like this are an opportunity to continue this constructive dialogue with the public and its elected representatives on the terrorist threat we face as a nation today.
 
Strategic Assessment: The Global Terrorist Landscape in 2015
 

Today’s terrorist threat environment is dynamic and dangerous, as are the wide array of.........(click on the link above.)


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Monday, February 16, 2015

A Tale of Two Jihads: Comparing the al-Qaeda and ISIS Narratives

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Bloggers Note: see the graph below and the end of the article to begin to understand These thugs,


A member of the al-Qaeda linked jihadist group al-Nusra Front stands in a street of the northern Syrian city of Aleppo on January 11, 2014. (Baraa Al-Halabi/AFP/Getty Images)
 
The attraction of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) despite—or because of—its unapologetic brutality has prompted renewed international efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism through civilian-led responses rather than solely traditional law enforcement methods.

Part of the effort has been to challenge the legitimacy of extremist narratives or provide positive alternatives aimed at reducing the appeal and recruiting power of groups like ISIS.

For example, the Europe-based Sisters Against Violent Extremism aims to “develop alternative strategies for combating the growth of global terrorism” and challenge extremist thinking through critical debate.

As the ranks of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria continue to swell, the need to focus more proactively on prevention strategies such as these has grown.

Many efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism focus on the establishment of “counternarratives.” The idea being to challenge or delegitimize the myths and narratives of extremist ideologues, thereby lessening their appeal and, in the case of jihadist groups like ISIS, stemming the flow of foreign fighters and funding.

A number of attempts appear to be premised on the notion that jihadist groups are selling the same story and targeting a similar demographic. This is true to some extent: Groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have honed a sophisticated communications strategy that links local grievances and dynamics to a global master narrative—they’ve gone “glocal.”

Beyond this tailored approach, however, they are also selling two different stories or opportunities, and understanding this difference is critical to the development of effective preventive and responsive measures.

The similarities between the al-Qaeda and ISIS narratives include the focus on the obligation to perform jihad by all able-bodied Muslims. In both al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s publication Inspire and ISIS’s Dabiq the concept of abandoning or abstaining from jihad while proclaiming to be Muslim is seen as hypocrisy. Both organizations also portray the West (particularly the United States) and its allies as nations that are hostile to Muslims.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS both frame their ideologies within the conception of Dar al-Harb (house of war) and Dar al-Islam (house of Islam), which, within the Salafi literalist context, asserts the incompatibility of Islam with secular law and governance.

The critical difference between the two groups that needs to be a key factor in counternarrative strategies concerns their ultimate aims.

While al-Qaeda portrays itself primarily as a militant group—a covert, almost Delta Force-like organization of specialized fighters and operational masterminds—

ISIS’s narrative draws on the discourses of statebuilding and governance, with a more established goal of creating and managing a Utopian state and calling for doctors, cleaners, and others to contribute in their own capacities. Recent reports even suggest ISIS is distributing food aid to Syrian refuges, stamping its logo on World Food Programme supplies.

Al-Qaeda’s Inspire features three primary focus areas that can be considered the essence of the organization’s narrative. The first is a focus on militant activities and terrorism through the glorification of martyrs and the glossy documentation of successful operations.

There is almost a complete absence of literature discussing concepts such as zakat, jizya, or dawah, which can be loosely defined as charity from Muslims, taxation of non-Muslims, and preaching of the Islamic faith.

The second notable feature of Inspire is its utility as a DIY guide for weapon assembly, with each issue containing detailed instructions for fabricating bombs and other tools of terrorism.

Lastly, the magazine promotes the perpetration of “lone wolf” acts of terror by individuals that can have absolutely no formal association with al-Qaeda.

In sum, the narrative found in Inspire is one primarily focused on violent, punitive, and retaliatory actions against the West and lacks consideration toward any specifics of Islamic governance.

In contrast, the narrative espoused in ISIS’s Dabiq is largely focused on building an actual state based on a radical, or takfiri, interpretation of Islam reflected in the group’s slogan baqiya wa tatamaddad (remaining and expanding).

Though ISIS also encourages lone wolf-style terrorism, the magazine issues multiple appeals for doctors, engineers, and professionals to make hijrah (migration) in order to assist in the construction of an Islamic government.

The narrative sculpted by ISIS rests heavily on the ability to govern, as illustrated by its numerous articles discussing the social services, security, and dignity provided to Muslims under the Caliphate it has proclaimed.

Consistent with the beliefs of the group’s forefather Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ISIS’s narrative is sectarian in nature and promotes extreme prejudice against those deemed un-Islamic.

This is clearly illustrated in the group’s assertion that it is the obligation of Muslims to destroy Shiite shrines, tombs, and mosques when possible. This narrative has also attracted other jihadists such as disaffected Taliban commanders and members from Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Venn Diagram

It is important to note that the approach to violence is also different for both groups. Al-Qaeda, and particularly Bin Laden’s early communications, portrayed a defensive jihad, a battle to promote and protect the ummah, or global Muslim community, from the onslaught of the West.

While certainly there was unforgivable violence and attacks on non-combatants, there was also some attempt in the rhetoric to justify this or even contain the repercussions. Consequently, al-Zarqawi’s bloodlust in Iraq met the condemnation of leaders and members of al-Qaeda’s inner circle, who appeared to have been concerned that the sheer brutality of such campaigns would alienate key followers.

 In contrast, ISIS appears to revel in its savagery, and the hostile treatment and killing of hostages appears to draw more recruits, even as it disgusts the world. As the New Yorker’s George Packer noted:

“The point isn’t to use the right level of violence to achieve limited goals. The violence is the point, and the worse the better. The Islamic State doesn’t leave thousands of corpses in its wake as a means to an end. Slaughter is its goal—slaughter in the name of higher purification. Mass executions are proof of the Islamic State’s profound commitment to its vision.”
 
What does this mean for policies and practices aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism and reducing the pool of recruits and resources for these groups? In the case of al-Qaeda, or at least the group as it existed under Bin Laden, reports of killing Muslims, unrestrained violence, poor treatment of members, and leadership fractures could prove useful in challenging the idealized myth of a defensive movement.

In the case of ISIS, which presents itself almost as a “mass death cult” as Packer noted, these same measures may have little appeal, especially as more and younger recruits get their jihadist sound bites off YouTube and are less inclined to ponder the rationale of a “just war” doctrine.

Counternarratives will need to focus less on the idea that support for the group is irrational and more on ISIS’s inability to meet the standards of leadership and governance, the bleak realities of the battlefield, and the inhospitality of the Caliphate to the very people it purports to hail as its citizens.

To be successful, such efforts will require a much greater investment by governments and partners, who have so far continued to focus on militarized efforts that have little impact on changing the value systems and perceptions of vulnerable individuals or groups.

Naureen Chowdhury Fink (lead author) is Head of Research and Analysis at the Global Center on Cooperative Security. Benjamin Sugg is a Research Assistant at the Global Center on Cooperative Security and completing his graduate degree at Johns Hopkins University.