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re:publica 2015 – Eric King: The Five Eyes secret European allies
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TRANSCRIOT
00:18
hey everyone hey doing so yes sir my
00:22
name's Eric King I'm the deputy director
00:25
of an NGO in London called privacy
00:27
international one year ago I was here
00:30
talking about the five eyes how they
00:33
were formed where they began and we ran
00:39
through after World War two seventy
00:43
years ago this spying alliance was
00:46
created and far from being separate
00:49
signals intelligence agencies the spying
00:53
agency of the UK GCHQ the spying agency
00:56
of the u.s. the NSA Australia New
01:00
Zealand and Canada have instead been
01:03
acting as one as a single force
01:06
intercepting all of our private
01:09
communications and sharing them with
01:11
each other by default they have shared
01:14
bases in Amman and in Australia they get
01:19
promoted so if you're a GCHQ officer and
01:22
you want to go and spend some time at
01:24
NSA your lunch room pass gets you into
01:27
the lunchroom at Fort Meade in the US
01:29
such is their level of integration and
01:33
their offices as a result often get
01:37
confused about who exactly they're
01:39
working for spies that work for GCHQ and
01:43
NSA have said the national product the
01:46
communications that we're intercepting
01:47
is often indistinguishable they don't
01:50
know what to come from GCHQ and what has
01:53
come from the NSA the cooperation
01:56
between the countries particularly in
01:58
SIGINT is so close that it becomes very
02:01
difficult to know who is doing what it's
02:05
just organisational mess now this is so
02:09
important because unless we understand
02:12
how our intelligence agencies work
02:14
internationally who they're cooperating
02:17
with then we cannot hold them to account
02:19
we cannot ensure that their actions are
02:22
being properly regulated by law and that
02:24
they're not playing games of
02:25
jurisdictional arbitrage playing off
02:28
each other's legal frameworks to reduce
02:31
all
02:31
our rights to the lowest common
02:33
denominator so the theme of this
02:37
conference this year is finding Europe
02:40
we've talked about the five eyes we're
02:43
now going to talk about the nine eyes
02:46
because oh how I wish there were only
02:48
five eyes so this is basically all we
02:53
know about the nine eyes it's the five
02:57
eyes plus France the Netherlands Denmark
02:59
and Norway we don't know when they were
03:03
formed we don't know what their purpose
03:06
is the only reference we have to them is
03:09
in the documents released by Edward
03:11
Snowden the intelligence officers I've
03:14
spoken to say that most of the time this
03:17
group is focused on Afghanistan and
03:19
Russia but there's massive amounts of
03:22
raw intelligence sharing going on
03:25
between them we don't have any public
03:27
framework we don't have any
03:29
acknowledgement in any treaty or in any
03:33
of the parliaments these are the kind of
03:36
issues that we're still having to unpick
03:40
but the nine eyes are not the big player
03:43
in Europe the 14 eyes are the big player
03:48
in Europe also known as signals seniors
03:52
Europe or sickened seniors Europe this
03:55
is the five eyes plus France Netherlands
03:58
Denmark Norway Sweden Italy Spain
04:01
Belgium and Germany now we know a tiny
04:05
bit more and when I say a tiny bit I
04:07
mean I'm gonna tell you everything I
04:08
know and I can only tell you about 30
04:11
seconds worth they were formed in 1982
04:15
and that's it that's all we know we have
04:21
one reference found about them in every
04:24
single document that I've read and we
04:27
have a small library at the NGO I work
04:29
out privacy international which is just
04:31
full of every single book about
04:32
intelligence agencies their history
04:34
autobiographies of offices everything we
04:37
really nerd out about this stuff and
04:38
there isn't a single reference only one
04:41
has been found and it's here which says
04:44
that there's a real
04:45
general database system in Europe where
04:48
the second organizations of NSA B and D
04:51
GCHQ DGSE in France Italian etc etc
04:55
share raw data so again this is the
05:00
existence of another signals
05:02
intelligence sharing framework where
05:04
they're sharing massive amounts of raw
05:07
private communications that each one of
05:09
us send and we know almost nothing about
05:12
them but there's more second scene is
05:21
Europe is the closest group of those
05:23
tied to the five eyes but many many more
05:26
intelligence agencies across Europe
05:28
cooperate with the five eyes and here
05:31
we've added Austria Czech Republic
05:33
Croatia Poland and so all of a sudden
05:37
you can see that most of Europe is
05:40
cooperating in some way with NSA in some
05:44
way with GCHQ and this is a bigger
05:48
problem than just Europe we have the
05:50
similar thing here this was signal
05:52
senior's Europe we also have signal
05:54
seniors Pacific as well so how close are
05:58
these relationships well it's important
06:01
to say that when you enter into a
06:03
third-party relationship and that's what
06:05
these things are called this isn't a
06:07
trivial exercise this is a Declassified
06:11
document from the an internal NSA
06:13
quarterly called Cryptologic quarterly
06:16
and it talks about how obtaining
06:21
material and instigating these
06:23
relationships is a very very significant
06:26
task it requires staff coordination
06:28
material handers in some circumstances
06:32
they choose not to enter in
06:33
relationships because the NSA is just
06:35
not getting good value for money when
06:38
you enter these things there's a big
06:39
quid pro quo you really have to be
06:42
exchanging something for something else
06:44
right this isn't a one-way flow more
06:49
recently there was a document disclosed
06:51
by Edward Snowden that gave us a bit
06:52
more information about how the NSA
06:55
thinks about these third-party
06:56
relationships
06:59
and they said here that they form these
07:01
when the secant exchangers have
07:03
increased in volume and complexity or
07:06
you need rapid direct exchange of
07:08
information the NSA says that in
07:12
exchange for providing the third party
07:14
so this is BND or similar we provide
07:17
them unique accesses with technical
07:20
solutions and/or access to related
07:23
technology so here the nd has the
07:26
geographical location the access to big
07:29
undersea fiber-optic cables that are
07:31
coming in and out of the country NSA one
07:33
a part of that GCHQ want a part of that
07:36
and so they provide them with the
07:37
equipment they provide them with the
07:39
software in exchange for them getting
07:41
some of that information back now NSA
07:45
does it just for the information but
07:47
also NSA will go further it might be
07:51
willing to share advanced techniques in
07:53
return for that partners willingness to
07:55
do something politically risky now
08:02
Edward Snowden's told us about all of
08:04
this and he when he was presenting to
08:06
the European Parliament he explains that
08:08
it goes much deeper than this he talked
08:13
about something called the Foreign
08:14
Affairs Directorate at the National
08:16
Security Agency and here's how he
08:20
explained what it does one of the
08:22
foremost activities of the Foreign
08:23
Affairs Division is to pressure or
08:26
incentivize EU Member States to change
08:29
their laws to enable mass surveillance
08:33
lawyers from the NSA as well as the UK
08:37
GCHQ worked very hard to search for
08:40
loopholes in laws and constitutional
08:43
protections that they can use to justify
08:45
indiscriminate dragnet surveillance
08:47
operations in recent public memory we've
08:51
seen these legal guidance operations
08:53
occur in Sweden and the Netherlands so
08:59
here NSA is saying we want access to
09:02
your cables we want access to the
09:04
information you've got and you're not
09:06
spying on enough people so we're going
09:08
to come and we're going to pressure you
09:10
and encourage you
09:12
to change your laws or work out legal
09:15
loopholes that you can exploit to make
09:17
yourselves feel better than what you're
09:18
doing is constitutionally in human
09:20
rights compliant this is a map of the
09:31
undersea cables that flow in and out of
09:34
Europe and you can see just how many the
09:38
second partners that we've talked about
09:39
have access to Snowden said that when
09:46
you start getting these new restrictions
09:49
in place once you've changed the law in
09:52
these countries the next thing that NSA
09:54
do once they've successfully subverted
09:57
or helped repeal legal restrictions
09:59
against unconstitutional mass
10:01
surveillance it encourages them to
10:03
perform access operations these are the
10:06
operations to gain access to bulk
10:08
communications of all major
10:10
telecommunications providers in the
10:12
jurisdiction this is one of the programs
10:18
that we learned about it's called
10:19
rampart and this is doing exactly what
10:22
Edward Snowden has described here here
10:24
country X one of the second senior
10:27
Europe partners has access to an
10:29
undersea fiber-optic cable they tap it
10:32
the NSA or GCHQ has provided the
10:36
technology for them to do that and you
10:38
can see here they then get a copy of it
10:40
while it's been processed domestically
10:43
in 2011 the NSA spent 91 million on
10:49
encouraging these kinds of operations in
10:51
these partner countries there's now 13
10:55
sites doing this kind of work around the
10:58
world
10:58
the locations we're still unclear of but
11:01
we can begin to guess at what some of
11:03
them are one of them is almost certainly
11:07
Germany just yesterday we found out the
11:11
day before yesterday we found out a new
11:15
cooperation between the BND
11:17
and GCHQ and here in very very clear
11:20
terms it says that the British Secret
11:23
Service GCHQ offered the BND
11:25
advanced acquisition and processing
11:26
systems if Germany were tap into the
11:29
transit data lines and exchange the raw
11:32
data back with GCHQ this isn't just in
11:38
Germany we've had exactly the same thing
11:40
in Denmark which is also thought to be
11:42
another rampart a country here in a
11:47
secret document that was released by
11:48
Snowden it said that they wanted to
11:51
remind the Danes of the long term
11:53
relationship looking at cable accesses
11:58
now in the Netherlands we have the same
12:02
thing now the Netherlands is an
12:04
interesting legal circumstance because
12:07
they can't do large bulk interception of
12:11
cables the law prohibits that the only
12:14
thing that they can do in bulk is
12:16
something that comes from the sky from
12:17
satellites so anything that isn't cable
12:20
bound is okay but if it's through a
12:22
cable the Netherlands the Dutch are not
12:25
allowed to look at it now GCHQ has not
12:28
been very happy about this and so as
12:30
part of their operation from an internal
12:33
GCHQ document we found out that GCHQ
12:35
said they have some legislative issues
12:38
that they need to work through before
12:40
their legal environment would allow them
12:42
to operate in the way that GCHQ does we
12:46
are providing legal advice on how we
12:48
have tackled some of these issues to
12:49
Dutch lawyers now here's one of the
12:57
questions that I find really interesting
12:58
about intelligence sharing so the Dutch
13:01
aren't allowed to tap undersea
13:02
fiber-optic cables okay but GCHQ are so
13:08
can the Dutch receive in bulk
13:10
information that's come from a source
13:13
the undersea cables that they're not
13:15
allowed to get unfortunately yes the
13:21
Oversight Committee looked at this and
13:23
they said that if they're not going to
13:25
look at the legality of where the
13:27
information comes from
13:28
despite the fact that they've admitted
13:31
that they are receiving data in bulk
13:33
from foreign partners and this is the
13:37
problem with intelligent sharing it
13:38
creates this race to the bottom where
13:40
the lowest protections that are offered
13:43
in a country are the ones that are used
13:45
and explained it's the same in Sweden
13:50
now Sweden's had a particularly close
13:52
relationship with the NSA stretching
13:54
back 50 years but the five eyes had a
13:57
fight amongst themselves eight years ago
13:59
previously GCHQ was the lead agency with
14:03
with with Sweden and anything dealing
14:06
with communications interception it was
14:08
a GCHQ lead NSA had the lead on
14:10
electronic interception Elland they
14:15
renegotiated this but what they had to
14:18
promise each other and this is what this
14:19
document says is that they needed to
14:20
keep each other informed of what they
14:22
were doing with the with the FR a and
14:25
they must always exchange all
14:28
information that comes through and in
14:32
2011 the FR a provided new access to the
14:36
NSA on the undersea fiber optic cable
14:39
interception that's taking place in
14:41
sweden in spain it's unclear just how
14:47
far the CNI the Center for national
14:49
intelligence is going but documents have
14:51
told us that GCHQ are working with them
14:54
on IP focused interception in France
15:00
it's a similar story dgse they're also
15:03
according to leaked documents GCHQ has
15:06
says that they have they've been very
15:09
keen to provide presentations on their
15:11
work which included cipher detection in
15:13
high-speed bearers high-speed bearers is
15:16
spook lingo for undersea fibre optic
15:20
cables
15:24
and so we have this system where
15:26
different states are now passing laws
15:30
allowing themselves to do mass
15:32
surveillance they're being encouraged
15:35
and helped to do so by GCHQ and by NSA
15:38
who are providing the the the legal
15:40
framework and passing them on the back
15:42
allowing them to feel good about what
15:43
they're doing but the state still feel
15:47
that they need to protect their own
15:49
citizens of course and so what happens
15:51
is that this all gets negotiated out so
15:54
Britain says to NSA okay we're gonna tap
15:56
these cables you can have a copy but you
15:58
can't look for Brits okay you can't look
16:01
for Brits Germany says the same thing to
16:04
NSA okay we'll let you tap the cables
16:06
we'll give you a copy we'll take a copy
16:08
as well but and I say you can't look for
16:10
Germans same thing they say in Sweden
16:14
same thing they say in the Netherlands
16:16
and of course that doesn't get us very
16:20
far it means for one that my
16:24
communication can still be intercepted
16:26
by any of the other intelligence
16:29
agencies in Europe who owe me no
16:31
obligations whatsoever only GCHQ at the
16:34
moment or even attempting to provide me
16:37
with any obligations and of course once
16:40
that interception has taken place and it
16:42
all goes into the same pot that first
16:45
negotiation is is useless anyway and
16:48
Snowden told us about this he said the
16:51
result of this is a European Bazaar
16:53
where EU member states like Denmark may
16:56
give the NSA access to a tapping centre
16:59
on the unenforceable condition that NSA
17:02
doesn't search it for danes and germany
17:04
may give the NSA access to another on
17:06
the condition it doesn't search for
17:08
Germans yet the - tapping centres might
17:11
be on the - points but on exactly the
17:13
same cable so NSA simply captures the
17:16
communications of the German citizens
17:18
when they're going through Denmark and
17:20
the Danish citizens as they go through
17:23
Germany
17:24
all the while no none of the legal
17:28
frameworks that they've set some up
17:29
amongst themselves have been broken
17:31
every state can put their hands on the
17:34
heart and say we're protecting you our
17:35
citizens we've negotiated strong again
17:38
these big intelligence agencies don't
17:40
you worry and everyone gets to feel very
17:43
very proud of themselves and so this is
17:49
all being justified under these very
17:52
very broad legal frameworks there's only
17:56
four states that have really actively
17:59
legislated for strategic surveillance
18:02
although we can add France to this list
18:04
with the new law that came through
18:05
yesterday
18:07
all of them hint at the idea that what
18:11
you're spying on are foreigners we're
18:13
looking outside our borders and as a
18:15
result we don't owe them any protections
18:18
and when you look through the
18:20
legislation that's what you find there's
18:22
not a single law in Europe that offers
18:24
any protections when you intercept the
18:27
communications for people not inside
18:29
your jurisdiction and when you receive
18:37
information or share information
18:39
the laws treat it the laws treated in a
18:45
very peculiar way many of these laws
18:48
were created and drafted as though
18:50
intelligent sharing was me having a PDF
18:53
document that I keep in a manila
18:55
envelope and that I passed to you that's
18:57
how they're constructed and when you see
18:59
the debates in some of the countries
19:00
when their laws have been passed that's
19:02
what was thought of about intelligence
19:05
sharing that it was singular bits of
19:06
refined information and that isn't what
19:09
intelligent sharing is now it isn't what
19:12
happens between Sigyn signals
19:14
intelligence agencies it's billions of
19:16
Records being shared every single day
19:19
amongst these states our laws are not
19:23
taking this into account they're not
19:25
reflecting this and we're losing for it
19:27
as a result so what have we been doing
19:31
well we've been trying to get access to
19:34
these arrangements so we asked GCHQ fit
19:38
a copy of them and we asked them for a
19:41
copy of the five ice age arrangement and
19:44
we also asked them a copy of their
19:46
canteen menu they said they couldn't
19:50
provide us both a copy of the
19:52
five eyes arrangement or their canteen
19:54
menu for national security so we filed
19:59
thank you
20:03
and so we file to the European Court of
20:07
Human Rights demanding that they provide
20:10
us with a copy of their canteen menu and
20:12
a copy of the five eyes arrangement now
20:18
these things are so important because
20:20
it's how the Intelligence Sharing works
20:22
that underpins how this whole system can
20:25
be understood and how the loopholes are
20:27
exploited that infringe all of our
20:29
fundamental rights we sued another we've
20:32
took another case against GCHQ and in
20:34
the course of our litigation we forced
20:37
them to disclose for the first time and
20:39
a description of how the Intelligence
20:43
Sharing works this is it
20:44
this is all we got they had a secret
20:46
hearing we're just the tribunal and the
20:49
government got to talk amongst
20:50
themselves
20:51
we weren't even told the date when this
20:53
was taking part but we forced and we
20:55
managed to get a hold of this and what
20:58
we found is that GCHQ are being very
21:01
very clever as they are in how they read
21:04
the law our politicians tell us our
21:06
agencies don't intentionally circumvent
21:09
the law well that's true so long as you
21:13
have a very particular understanding of
21:15
what circumvention means and here we
21:18
find out that they don't consider GCHQ
21:22
is intentionally circumventing the law
21:24
when they couldn't technically get the
21:28
information any other way and so GCHQ
21:34
would argue that it could not
21:35
technically intercept all communications
21:38
going in and out of the u.s. so it's not
21:42
a circumvention of the law for them to
21:44
be able to receive all of that
21:45
information without a warrant this is
21:49
how they're justifying it this is how
21:51
they're getting away with it well they
21:55
also told the court is that when they
21:58
share information between agencies there
22:01
are have strong internal safeguards
22:03
underpinning how it all works
22:06
now we didn't find out what they were
22:07
the court wouldn't tell us but a few
22:10
weeks later more documents were released
22:12
and we got an a bit of a hint of what
22:14
some of these things could be this is a
22:18
document dealing with GCSB who are the
22:20
New Zealand's Intelligence Agency and
22:22
it's talking about what happens when the
22:25
US wants to get access to the raw
22:27
intercepted data that GCSB have and they
22:31
talk about the strong internal
22:32
safeguards that our own place first an
22:36
analyst needs to log into a system
22:38
called I learn it then needs to take
22:41
select a PowerPoint presentation called
22:43
New Zealand s ID seven it then reads the
22:47
presentation and then they have to take
22:50
a multiple-choice open book test if they
22:56
feel that they've passed the test
23:00
they then copy and paste the results
23:02
into a Word document
23:05
that's it that's the strong internal
23:10
safeguards that they have to ensure that
23:12
the analysts in each country are
23:14
respecting the laws of the other
23:16
stations a self-assess open book test
23:21
where you copy and paste the answers
23:23
into a Word document this is the biggest
23:26
spying alliance that's ever been created
23:29
and this is the legal system that is
23:31
protecting us I couldn't believe it when
23:35
I saw this I genuinely thought that they
23:37
would do better how wrong I was
23:41
so we sue GCHQ and we lost on a lot of
23:46
points on each one of those points we've
23:48
lost we've appealed to the European
23:50
Court of Human Rights but we won on one
23:52
point they said that in the course of
23:56
our suing GCHQ and they had to reveal
23:59
this information but it was only because
24:02
this information was revealed that it
24:05
was now legal but until this information
24:08
was revealed it was illegal so the court
24:12
said that all intelligent sharing from
24:15
NSA to GCHQ for the last 70 years
24:19
was unlawful every bit of information
24:22
the hundred and twelve billion text
24:25
messages that are exchanged every single
24:26
day the 98 million records from
24:29
geolocation shared to GCHQ every single
24:32
day completely unlawful and we're making
24:36
good use of this because it's been
24:39
declared unlawful we think that you
24:41
every single person in here has a right
24:44
to find out whether your communications
24:46
were part of those unlawfully shared
24:48
whether your fundamental rights were
24:51
breached and so we've set up a platform
24:54
where you can enter in some details and
24:56
we're going to assist you in completing
24:59
forms that you can send to the tribunal
25:01
where they have an obligation to tell
25:04
you if your communications were part of
25:07
those unlawfully shared so please please
25:10
please if you haven't already done it go
25:11
to privacy international art org forward
25:13
slash illegal spying and you can sign up
25:15
to find out whether your communications
25:18
were part of those illegally shared from
25:20
NSA to GCHQ one of the other points that
25:26
we lost to the tribunal was that we were
25:30
trying to argue that GCHQ oh you
25:32
assuming well we're all outside the UK
25:35
and so now I've lost my rights
25:37
GCHQ don't treat my communications with
25:40
any additional safeguards so every
25:42
single one of us here we were saying
25:43
should be treated equally as whether and
25:46
as if you're in the UK the court didn't
25:51
like that the court didn't like that but
25:55
the reason that they gave for why they
25:56
weren't finding in our favor is because
25:59
the number of people that they'd need to
26:01
get individual warrants for would be too
26:04
large they say that they can't offer
26:08
every single person here the same
26:09
protections as those inside the UK
26:11
because they're spying on too many
26:13
people this is what the court found
26:16
persuasive
26:20
now we're talking about all of this
26:24
because our intelligence agencies are
26:27
there outpacing us they are finding
26:31
loopholes and they're staying one step
26:34
ahead
26:35
they're staying one step ahead even more
26:36
of our politicians when Nicky Hager an
26:39
investigative journalist wrote his book
26:41
about GCSB he said he got David Longley
26:45
who's the who was a New Zealand prime
26:48
minister very well-respected and then
26:51
the ex New Zealand Prime Minister said
26:53
it was until he read this book about the
26:57
New Zealand intelligence agencies that
26:59
he had any idea that New Zealand had
27:02
been committed to an international
27:04
integrated electronic spying Network he
27:07
didn't know he said it's an outrage that
27:11
him and other ministers were told so
27:13
little and raises the question of who
27:15
they alternate Lee saw themselves
27:17
answerable now a leaked document has
27:24
said that NSA are feeling quite
27:25
comfortable with the situation that
27:27
they're in they're saying for a variety
27:30
of reasons our intelligence
27:31
relationships are rarely disrupted by
27:34
foreign political perpetration x'
27:35
international or dismiss domestic and
27:38
they explained in this document that in
27:41
many of the foreign partners capitals
27:43
very few senior officials outside of the
27:45
intelligence apparatus even know about
27:48
any signals intelligence connection to
27:50
the US at all the new NSA commander has
27:57
gone a bit further and he said clearly
27:59
there are some nations that have been
28:01
very vocal very visible in their
28:03
frustration and their unhappiness but we
28:05
have a level of capability in reach that
28:08
few if any can replicate the value that
28:11
NSA provides is almost irreplaceable
28:15
they know that they're the big brother
28:18
in the room they know that they're the
28:19
one pushing for mass surveillance in all
28:22
these states around the world
28:23
forcing countries to weaken their
28:25
domestic protections and creating this
28:27
system where we're in a global race to
28:30
the bottom where people are trying to
28:32
hold them accountable they're putting
28:34
pressure
28:34
they're saying no you can't find out
28:36
this information and I say this is what
28:39
we now need to do we need to expose
28:41
these relationships we need to shine a
28:43
light on how these organizations work
28:46
together in our courts and in our
28:48
parliaments so that we can bring our
28:50
intelligence agencies once and for all
28:52
under the rule of law thank you very
28:56
much
29:10
thanks it thanks Eric yes Oh already and
29:13
happy hey I really enjoyed your talk and
29:19
I like the work that you do I have one
29:22
question and I mean it with all due
29:23
respect but it won't sound like that I'm
29:26
sorry in advance but how can you believe
29:31
the that you said about the law
29:33
protecting us when it is so clear that
29:35
for the entire time we've had liberal
29:37
democracies intelligence communities
29:39
have crept up and circumvented the law
29:42
isn't it the case that law alone is
29:44
simply insufficient to prevent these
29:46
people from doing these things if they
29:48
cared at all about the law they
29:50
wouldn't be stripping people of their
29:52
citizenship and drone striking them as
29:54
Theresa May does with the GCHQ
29:56
intelligence information so why do we
29:59
want a legal solution I mean how can the
30:04
law solve this it hasn't solved us
30:05
that's insanity to continue to try to
30:07
use the law so what is the actual thing
30:10
that we can actually do so I'm an
30:13
optimist Mattila
30:15
hi I agree the law doesn't solve the
30:19
world's problems but I think it's a
30:21
crucial part of it I think that it's one
30:24
of the better ways that we can use to
30:26
set what our values mean to our agencies
30:28
and ultimately I feel that we need to
30:32
convince the agencies to change we we
30:36
need them to change their system and not
30:39
want to keep exploiting it
30:41
now I don't think this is gonna happen
30:43
by winning three legal cases it's gonna
30:45
take an entirely a huge shift in how we
30:48
all think about it how our governments
30:51
work how we oversee agencies what their
30:54
role should be in the first place should
30:56
they even exist as we're currently
30:58
understanding and thinking of them we're
31:00
a long long way off that but without the
31:03
law then I see us in a battle where they
31:07
have a lot more power and I want
31:10
technology to play a big role in that
31:12
and that's why everything we do is
31:14
encrypted and everything that you do
31:16
should always of course always be
31:18
encrypted as well but we need both and
31:21
that's why I sue GCHQ that's why
31:24
we fight in the courts to use other
31:26
tools to also help protect each and
31:28
every one of us okay if you if you have
31:39
any more questions he'll be around after
31:42
you can find a drink
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