|
In
a double decision made public on Thursday 12 March 2020, three judges
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) deprived European midwives
of the guarantee of their right to conscientious objection to abortion.
This decision (Grimmark and Steen v. Sweden.) can apply, by extension, to the entire medical profession.
To
make such a decision, they declared that abortion is an ordinary
medical act, and that general access to abortion takes precedence over
respect for personal freedom of conscience.
The
appeals in question had been lodged by two Swedish midwives who were
unable to practise their profession because their requests not to
perform abortions were systematically rejected by their employers. These
refusals were validated by the Swedish authorities, Sweden being one of
the very few countries that do not recognise the right of conscientious
objection to abortion. Abortion is “available on demand” up to 18 weeks
and happens in one pregnancy out of five.
The
ECtHR, seized by the two women, entrusted their applications to a small
committee of only three judges, a procedure reserved for simple cases.
The judges agreed with the Swedish authorities, ruling that the
obligation to perform abortion serves “the legitimate aim of protecting
the health of women seeking an abortion”. They also consider that it is
necessary to oblige these two midwives to carry out abortions in order
to make the practice available throughout Sweden.
Finally,
they consider that they have “voluntarily chosen to become a midwife
and apply for vacant posts while knowing that this would mean assisting
also in abortion cases”.
At
no time did the three judges take into account the fact that the
midwives offered to perform other tasks to compensate for the possible
inconvenience to the service caused by their objection. Nor did they
want to see the obvious, namely that respect for the conscience of these
two midwives would in no way hinder access to abortion in Sweden. Nor
did they point out that the Convention guarantees freedom of conscience,
but not a “right to abortion”, or even a right to health, assuming that
abortion is carried out to “protect health”.
In
fact, these two midwives have been sacrificed to the dogma of abortion.
Freedom of conscience is emptied of its substance; it is worthless in
the face of abortion. Yet, it must be remembered: this act puts an end
to a human life. The drafters of the Convention must turn over in their
graves, they who wanted to protect human life and freedom from state
ideology.
|
|
This
decision is a complete departure from previous judgments of the Court,
which had hitherto refused to reduce the right to conscientious
objection to medical or surgical abortion. It had only ruled that a
person entitled to have an abortion should be able to have access to it
from another doctor, when her doctor exercised the conscience clause (R.R. v. Poland).
In
its new decision, the Court reduces the protection of midwives to that
of pharmacists, to whom the Court has already denied the guarantee of
this right in respect of the sale of abortive products.
Even
more seriously, this decision indicates to the governments that they
may now abolish the conscience clauses without exposing themselves to
the condemnation of the ECtHR. This is a major regression of freedom of
conscience, carried out in the name of a Court which claims to be “The
Conscience of Europe”. We should always be alert when an institution, or
a political leader, claims to be “The” conscience of all.
It
should be stressed that the logic of this decision can be applied
beyond midwives, to all medical professions, and to any “medical” act,
as long as it is legal. The exercise of medical professions is thus made
precarious, if not impossible, for any person who respects human life.
Christians are already the main victims.
The
Court was fully aware of the importance of these cases, so much so that
they were publicized and exposed in European and international bodies.
It is therefore abnormal and shocking that such a decision should be
taken only by a committee of three judges, and not by a chamber of seven
judges, or a Grand Chamber of 17 judges.
Indeed,
in principle, a committee of three judges can only conduct routine
cases by applying previous established case law. When the question is
more complex or new, it must be dealt with in a chamber or even a Grand
Chamber.
It
should also be pointed out that these three judges did not give their
ruling in the form of a judgment, subject to appeal, but rather a simple
“decision of inadmissibility”, which is therefore final. Thus, it is a
decision of exceptional importance that was adopted in a small committee
and “through the back door”. This approach is cunning, but it could
also be contradicted in the future by a higher chamber.
An international campaign against conscientious objection
This
decision is part of an international campaign led by some pro-abortion
NGOs over the past 15 years to remove the conscience clause on abortion
on the grounds that this clause would “stigmatise abortion” and hinder
its practice. In fact, in some countries, an increasing number of people
are refusing to perform abortions as a result of advances in ultrasound
and prenatal medicine.
This
campaign can be seen today in France in the attempt to remove the
conscience clause introduced by the Veil law. It can also be seen in the
United Nations Human Rights Committee, the World Medical Association,
and in the recent report of Ahmed Shaheed, UN Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Religion or Belief. His predecessor, on the other hand, had reaffirmed this right
at the invitation of the ECLJ. Already in 2010, it was against this
campaign that the ECLJ finally obtained the adoption, by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, of a resolution
reaffirming “The right to conscientious objection in lawful medical
care”. Following this vote, the Swedish Parliament adopted a resolution
committing its government to take international action against
conscientious objection.
The profile of the judges
The publication of the ECLJ’s report
on “NGOs and judges of the ECHR” recalled that the ECtHR is composed of
persons with various commitments which may cast doubt on the
impartiality of the Court. This report also showed that on a great many
occasions, judges have ruled when they were objectively in a situation
of conflict of interest.
It
is therefore advisable, particularly when the case is ideological, to
check the composition of the Court’s panels of judges. In the present
case, in addition to the Cypriot judge Georgios Serghides, the three
judges who ruled in this case include the Swedish judge Erik Wennerstöm
and the Maltese judge Lorraine Schembri Orland. The Swedish judge was
previously a member of the Swedish Gender Equality Agency,
the body officially charged with promoting “women’s rights” in Europe’s
most radically feminist and pro-abortion country. As for the Maltese
judge, her curriculum vitae indicates that she has held important
responsibilities in feminist structures since the end of the 1980s.
This is how we are now governed in Europe.
