,“Whatever has existed under the name of Wagner, those clandestine Russian mercenaries are still there and they don’t care about being noticed.” Putin is “directly intervening” by sending 6,000 tonnes of weaponry to east Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, explains RUSI’s Jalel Harchaoui.
,
“Whatever has existed under the name of Wagner, those clandestine Russian mercenaries are still there and they don’t care about being noticed.” Putin is “directly intervening” by sending 6,000 tonnes of weaponry to east Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, explains RUSI’s Jalel Harchaoui.
Wagner a name that we should no longer
use because the name doesn't exist
anymore but the reality of it is still
in place all those clandestine
mercenaries are still there they're
being paid slightly differently but
they're still physically there uh and on
top of it you have extra units that are
much less worried about being noticed or
not noticed they just don't care they
care much less and they are directly
working for the Russian uh defense
Ministry what is happening is
a Brazen avert effort by the Russian
state to um increase its presence in uh
I would say subsaharan Africa and uh
within that framework Libya is being
used as a crucial
platform uh we were used to the Russian
presence in
Libya uh but in covert form there was
always this effort to remain clandestine
you had all that story about Wagner is
Wagner linked to the Kremlin we don't
know maybe yes so you had that timid
version of what we're seeing now now
it's much more uh in your face uh should
I say and um even the use of uh the tuuk
port toook is a city located near the
Egyptian border on uh the Libyan
Coast um the Russians used it before
they have been using it for since 2016
but at a much lower scale you didn't
have a
flotilla uh that actually belongs to the
um Russian Armed Forces we're talking
about the Navy the frate that was
protecting the the main cargo uh vessel
was clearly part of the uh the ministry
of Defense we're talking about the
Russian Armed Forces protecting it and
then U stopping for six hours in toook
so six hours it's a very fast uh
operation that explains why a lot of the
satellite Watchers uh missed that uh key
event on April 8th uh and they were able
just in six hours to move in something
like 6,000 tons of uh material and um uh
we know that part of it is going to go
to uh countries like
ner um there are concerns about Chad
Chad is is an open question mark but one
thing is certain is that the military
presence on the part of the the Russian
state so the mercenaries that were there
before are still there they were
Incorporated informally and they remain
clandestine I'm talking about the new
layer that is being on added on top of
whatever has been in existence for the
last several years in Libya what we're
seeing is really the addition of you
know extra units and uh they're not
hiding I mean they're still you know
there's no clear reporting that's why
we're having this conversation but um
the uh what is happening is quite uh uh
ferocious in terms of uh assertiveness
well first of all the Western
democracies have been worried and
worried and and and the activity that
consists in being worried is not really
an event okay they should wonder whether
should they should take action because
the Russian state is I mean Russia under
Putin is a mean country those people are
not in the business of uh being uh
influenced by the fact that France or
the US are worried you know they uh they
change their behavior only when
confronted with physical action like
tangible coercion not diplomatic uh
messaging um and I'm not even sure that
the Western democracies have clearly
decided whether or not they were worried
are they worried I'm not even sure you
know um but one thing is certain is that
um it has multiple motivations you know
um so there's the natural resources that
the various African regimes are happy to
give uh Russia access to you have also
the ability going forward for Russia to
be able to influence the flow of
migrants going into the European Union
you have the possibility of inter
interdicting uh overflight you know uh
I'm talking about um Western flights
whether civilian or military over areas
like ner and Libya that's it's a big
deal and again uh I'm not certain that
uh France or or the United States have
clearly decided that it should happen or
should not happen but all these things
matter objectively I always remember
those few months that followed the uh
full-on invasion of Ukraine in February
2022 you had like a whole cage industry
like I'm thinking about the New Yorker
the New York Times other like the da
Beach you had a a flurry articles that
basically said falsely that simply
because Russia was uh grappling with
some difficulties in the Ukrainian
theater then we could all assume that
they would simply leave Africa all
together so I was horrified by those
articles because they were completely
disconnected from reality uh but it's
true that there was a slight reduction
like there was a decrease in the
Personnel but none of those missions
disappeared none of them
stopped uh now what we're seeing is
effectively Russia realizing that it's
doing much better much closer to victory
in Ukraine Washington is consumed and
distracted by its own
election atmosphere it's a year of
presidential
election and um and they can they have
the bre you know the the bandwidth they
have the environment they have of course
the distractedness caused by the Gaza
Strip uh war and now the Iran Israel
tensions so it's really a perfect storm
in terms of uh um opportunity uh it's
the ideal environment to do something
very very Brazen uh again not just in
Libya but also Vis ner binaso and I keep
repeating that I'm worried about Chad
it's actually important for the Russian
Nation like it goes back uh to Stalin
like there was this Obsession of having
a naval presence on the Libyan Coast you
it's a constant theme through the
decades it can you can take takes you
back to 1945 or even even before that um
and it is true that Putin you know
became um Head of State on 31st of
December 1999 a few months later he had
like a strategy paper uh underscoring
the importance of the
Mediterranean um and within that
framework having a permanent presence in
terms of Navy uh on on the Libyan Coast
was always uh coed it was always a dream
for for for Moscow and uh we know that
there are two Naval pres uh two Naval
bases already in Syria Tartus and lakia
and now we are basically witnessing in
slow motion the creation of a new form
of permanent presence uh in terms of the
Russian Navy uh this time on the African
continent so when you send material when
you send human resources and personnel
and Fighters and different systems if
you're Russia now you basically have
this very convenient option of s sending
it from Syria and it arrives directly
into North Africa you don't have to like
you know you don't have to set it by a
plane you don't have to go around the
continent or anything like that you're
just like injected through this very
welcoming part of under half family and
then you can safely take it into Sudan
or you can take it to ner or or or even
you can cross ner to take it to Mali you
have all kinds of very pleasant options
I don't think we should um have the
arrogance to know
exactly uh what was delivered it's
something that we are going to discover
in coming days for example overnight I
received some information from local s
ources in southern Libya where by the
way the Manpower the Russian Manpower
keeps growing like it was like the the
number of Russian uh Personnel in
southern Libya has probably been
multiplied by four over the last 3 four
months and what they're seeing those
eyewitnesses that I speak to on a
regular basis they see new equipment
that is being boasted that they can
actually just see it so as as we go
through the next few days we'll find out
what what was delivered probably armored
vehicles
uh artillary uh equipment in general and
and maybe some other toys fancy toys
it's like the two styles of interference
one is really going through uh great
length to uh
stay uh not deniable but let's say amb
ambivalent it's it's always denied by
the Kremlin you can never get a full
confirmation from any official always
trying to hide and uh also there was
this um
limitation because of financing Wagner
needed to be paid for every step that it
was going to perform to be to perform so
when the client let's say the haa family
in in eastern Libya had money troubles
then you would see slightly lower
Quality Equipment and um and of course
now what we're seeing is really the
Russian State directly intervene so it
has uh a greater capacity to um pursue
much more bold Bolder uh campaigns in
terms of injecting material and so on
and so forth so like I think the best
way to visualize it is that whatever has
existed under the name of Wagner a name
that we should no longer use because the
name doesn't exist anymore but the
reality of it is still in place all
those clandestine mercenaries are still
there they're being paid slightly
differently but they're still physically
there uh and on top of it you have extra
units that are much less worried about
being noticed on not noticed they just
don't care they care much less and they
are directly working for the Russian uh
defense Ministry we talked earlier about
the motivations of of Russia one of the
motivations not it's not the only one
one is to be able to acquire an option
to pressure the European Union and NATO
from its Southern flank much more easily
um so if there's a an energy crisis they
could precipitate a new blockade let's
say or if they want to block access to
airplanes that are used to flying over
Libya they could make it impossible so
they have now ways of creating uh more
concern for for the Europeans and I
would say the westerners so that's why I
wouldn't say that the International
Community is worried we're talking about
like here the target is really the
Western
democracies and um and on their side
there has been a tradition of always
being kind of ambivalent
with regard to Africa for example in the
history of the United States there was
never a moment when Washington
considered any part of Africa a vital
strategic interest that that such moment
never happened in the history of the
United States at least not since World
War II and now the us or should say
President Biden has to decide whether
it's important or not important it's
maybe they will take action or maybe
they will be lazy and soft and
ambivalent and complacent and and they
will allow
uh this expansion to continue but uh
it's it's not a the Russia is not going
to Africa to wage war they they go there
to build a much closer relationship to a
bunch of regimes that are very
enthusiastic working with Russia because
Russia never exerts any kind of pressure
on them from an ideological or
governance or anti-corruption
perspective um Russia pays itself
through them through all kind kind of
arrangements you know like access to
diamond
gold fuel in the case of uh haftar in
Libya and other goodies for example when
they acquire a strategic military base
they don't pay for it they get it for
free usually it's a it's part of their
reward is they are basically being
rewarded for doing what they want to do
anyway so this is really uh like heaven
on Earth for them um so you have this
enthusiasm that we should all bear in
mind on the part of the V the regimes
you know like whether it's the Nigerian
one or the Eastern Libyan one or uh
Sudanese rapid support forces even
borhan the um Sudanese Armed Forces we
might see General bhan get closer to
Russia over the next several months it
could mean that the West becomes less
and less relevant from a diplomatic
perspective from an economic perspective
from um a security perspective like and
and one reason the West is being so slow
is because it has it's basically
experiencing a huge amount of difficulty
imagining that Africa doesn't need the
wests they are like just yesterday there
was a high-profile a French General who
is in the process of being expelled from
a a large set of African countries and
he was talking about the potential
return sometime in the future very
vaguely right he described very vaguely
he's already anticipating the moment
where all those African governments will
regret what they did and they will have
to go down on their knees and invite
France back so this is the kind of uis
and delusion that is slowing down the
decision-making process on the part of
the western democracies they really uh
work under the assumption that Africa
cannot live without Western presence
well there are two things that um the us
could do and I I'm certain that a a
portion of Washington DC is actually
considering it very very seriously now
is all of Washington committed in that
direction I'm not certain but there's a
sco that consists in saying we should
use uh Force to at least damage and
Destroy valuable
equipment uh that Russia uses so in
order to increase the cost of their
expansion and slow it down you could
have covert air strike
that consist in destroying like cargo
planes that cost multiple millions of
euros and so if those kinds of
operations which I think have happened
in the past they start being implemented
on a more frequent basis on a more
Relentless basis than it could really
make a difference and then the other
thing that the US has never wanted to
consider up to now but now is forced to
is to go after the local actors that are
facilitating the Russian expansion that
we are talking about so in the case of
Libya it would be going after this uh
American citizen by the name of General
haftar who's the uh Libyan commander who
uh dominates Eastern Libya and Southern
Libya so there's a lot of people in thec
that not only have trouble imagining him
as an enemy of the United States but
actually they imagine him as the friend
of the United States so now they have to
kind of readjust to the current reality
and start drawing conclusions for me and
one consequence would be to start taking
issuing sanctions against either the
half Family itself which I doubt or
Close Associates of the haa family so it
would be a way to send a signal to the
haa family without hitting them directly
with sanctions I think we're going to
see um some facilities dedicated to
training African troops so you would
have like almost like a clearing room
you would would have uh the ability you
would have Russia moving fighters from
one country training them in some other
country and then sending them
potentially in the third country or like
including maybe Syria and Ukraine so you
have because the the intention of Russia
to increase uh its Manpower cannot be
really accomplished by just using
Russian Fighters they will have to use
African f fighters like it's a very
young continent you have plenty of of uh
Talent so here we'll see like some
explicit illustration of what I'm trying
to say which is um the emergence of
military training centers uh and we
would see them move uh young Africans
around and using them as part of their
own mission so those those those would
be mercenaries working for the Russian
State not working for their own
government um so you would see that and
uh I think we're seeing we we'll
continue seeing what we have seen which
is the an increase of the number of
Russians in Libya simply because Libya
is being seen as a lth as a as a
platform as a hub to uh conduct missions
that are really key for Russia in ner uh
and other
countries and uh I keep repeating myself
I think Chad should be seen as a
question
