Arab armies: agents of change? Before and after 2011

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http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Chaillot_Paper_131_Arab_armies.pdf  

Many aspects of the so-called Arab Spring came as a surprise: the mass demonstrations, the toppling of dictatorships, and indeed the timing. One of the most unexpected aspects, however, was the behaviour of the respective military forces. Regarded until 2011 as being unequivocal supporters of the regimes in power, they were expected to crack down on the demonstrators with an iron fist. Decades of military dictatorships, coups d’état and wars had entrenched the notion of Arab armed forces as agents of coercion, not agents of change.
But only one of the Arab militaries confronted with the massive social dislocation unleashed by the Arab Spring behaved in the expected way, i.e. unequivocally standing by the regime and suppressing the uprisings. The others facilitated regime change either actively or passively, and in Egypt assumed an even more direct role. In all cases, the armed forces were, and remain, the kingmakers, whose support is essential for rulers to hold onto, or accede to, power. But what drives these forces? Why do they choose to act, or not act, under certain political conditions? When do they have the capacity to act, and when is it that they do not?
While these questions are fundamental, they relate to the specific circumstances pertaining to the military in the post-2011 environment: how come the armed forces seem to possess the casting vote between secular and Islamist forces on the road to democracy? More puzzlingly, what is it that these forces stand for in the eyes of the populations in their respective countries – if it was modernity in the 1950s and 1960s, what is it today?
  

FORWORD

 

We all tend to look at new occurrences through old lenses: it is a fact of life.

Old lenses focus on those elements of the picture that appear most familiar but inevitably neglect or ignore those that are less so, thus missing the complexity of the whole picture. When the uprisings in the Arab world began three years ago,

Europeans – and Westerners at large – at first invoked familiar language: the term ‘spring’ echoed 1968 Prague or, further down the road of history, le printemps des
peuples

in 1848 Europe (the ‘contagion’ effect). Neither precedent was particularly

encouraging, as both were violently repressed – although those popular uprisings were eventually vindicated decades later.

Another recurrent comparison has been with 1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, despite the different geopolitical backgrounds (no crumbling Soviet-type ‘empire’in the MENA region). In retrospect, however, the analogy with 1989 appears useful
when comparing the speed and scope of ‘regime change’ after the uprisings. In

Central Europe, the pace of change accelerated as regimes toppled in one country and then another. In the Arab world, by contrast, the pace has become ever slower, from the lightning speed of the ‘Jasmine revolution’ in Tunisia to the protracted civil war in Syria – let alone the dogs that did not bark (as Sherlock Holmes might

have put it) in Algeria and elsewhere, or the twists and turns that occurred even in the countries affected by the ‘Arabellion’ (as the

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung actually did put it). From 1989 onwards, transformation became work in progress

in all Central European countries. Since 2011, each Arab country has taken a markedly different path, and inside a few of them the dynamics of change have hardly been linear.

 

Florence Gaub’s Chaillot Paper

offers us a new and original pair of lenses through  

which to look. It delves into the history, the sociology, the economics and the
politics of the different national armies in the Arab world, trying to explain both la longue durée of traditions and identities and la courte durée

of tactical decisions. It sheds light on why certain developments have occurred (or not occurred) in certain countries. It helps us read a map full of crossroads, dead ends and roads less travelled. And it highlights factors that will have to be taken into account in order to put together a more reliable picture of our Southern neighbours, and to be better prepared to act – and react – in the future.

Conclusion

  

There are altogether nineteen Arab military forces, eight of whom by and large maintain a posture of aloofness from politics. The remaining eleven, however, do play a decidedly political role in their respective countries, for better or for worse.

While the events of 2011 highlighted those cases in which armed forces have effectively assisted or impeded regime change, they also served to draw attention to the fact that the long absence of Arab forces from the political sphere does not imply their actual removal from politics.

Instead, Arab forces continue to play a role beyond their military purpose even in those states which did not experience large-scale unrest in 2011. The involvement of the military in politics is perceived with deep suspicion by rulers in Arab states, such as Jordan for example, which regard a powerful military as posing a threat to their stability. In societies which are highly polarised and politicised, the military is seen as being part and parcel of the secular-nationalist camp and therefore hardly a neutral agent of the state.

Arab military forces will, by and large, continue therefore to act as political agents. This does not necessarily imply direct involvement in politics, but they accompany change in one way or another. Such a stance is in part the result of the army’s institutional outlook, but is in part also due to the highly unstable and politically volatile environments in which they operate.

This in itself has policy implications for those who seek to engage with the Arab world. The removal of the armed forces from politics is, by default, a long-term goal for the EU and for international donors: according to a World Bank study,23 it took the fastest states 17 years to relegate armed forces to their defence role only.

Successful attempts at neutralising the political role of armed forces always take into account the two key dimensions of the military, the societal as well as the institutional dimensions.

Addressing the issue at the societal level will therefore require an approach which acknowledges the role these forces play beyond their primary military function.

Armed forces act not only because they can, but also because other social actors cannot (or will not) act. A solution to the question of the involvement of the military in politics always includes the civil society in which they are embedded.

23. World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington D.C: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2011), p. 11.

 

 

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Arab armies: agents of change? Before and after 2011

In addition to this, focusing on the institutional dimension of the armed forces provides a good starting point. First and foremost, the military is an institution seeking to accomplish its core task – the protection and defence of the state.

Assisting it in becoming a professional organisation will ultimately result in its gradual removal from politics, and the establishment of safe and sound civil military relations.

 

 

   

In addition to this, focusing on the institutional dimension of the armed forces provides a good starting point. First and foremost, the military is an institution seeking to accomplish its core task – the protection and defence of the state.

Assisting it in becoming a professional organisation will ultimately result in its gradual removal from politics, and the establishment of safe and sound civil military relations.